Abortion & the Public Square: An Examination of How American Secular Society Treats Religious Questions by Dashefsky, Hannah
Colgate Academic Review
Volume 8 (Fall 2010) Article 9
7-20-2012
Abortion & the Public Square: An Examination of
How American Secular Society Treats Religious
Questions
Hannah Dashefsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.colgate.edu/car
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons @ Colgate. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Colgate Academic Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colgate. For more information, please contact skeen@colgate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dashefsky, Hannah (2012) "Abortion & the Public Square: An Examination of How American Secular Society Treats Religious
Questions," Colgate Academic Review: Vol. 8, Article 9.
Available at: http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol8/iss1/9
! 110!
Hannah Dashefsky ‘11 
 
Abortion & the Public Square: An Examination of How American Secular Society Treats 
Religious Questions 
 
The Split 
In The Culture of Disbelief, law professor and writer Stephen Carter argues that in 
the contemporary United States there is an apparent split in terms of how American 
citizens treat the institution of organized, mainstream religion. On the one hand, there 
exists “a magnificent respect for freedom of conscience, including the freedom of 
religious belief.”1 This notion is supported by the first two parts of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, known respectively as the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise clause, which state: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”2 They dictate an 
American standard of religious acceptance and guarantee every American the right to 
practice the religion and hold the beliefs to which he or she subscribes. Practically, the 
two clauses mandate that the federal government does not favor one religion to others, 
nor that it favors the institution of religion to non-religion. However, though we live in a 
country where freedom of conscience and religious belief are founding principles, we 
must acknowledge that this freedom is limited. While it is almost unimaginable that 
someone would object to another’s use of a religious belief or principle as the reasoning 
behind a decision that would only affect the individual, the same cannot be said if the 
decision were to have an effect on the public. In other words, religious reasoning tends to 
be far less accepted, and viewed more critically, if the decision it justifies relates to a 
matter of public importance such as politics. This conclusion relates to Carter’s argument 
about the split treatment of religion: on the one hand we embrace the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause; we value our freedom of conscience. However, on 
the other hand we exhibit a raw fear of religion when it crosses certain boundaries and 
when individuals use it as justification for policies under which we all must live. 
According to Carter, we fear “religious domination in politics” and grow wary of those 
who take religion too seriously.3 Because of this fear, the public square treats questions of 
religion differently than it treats questions of secular subjects.4 In the following pages I 
will to defend Carter’s argument and use abortion, a hot-button issue in the contentious 
debate that surrounds religion and politics as a lens through which to examine it. In order 
to focus my discussion I will analyze two landmark cases, Roe vs. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood vs. Casey, and explain how they support Carter’s argument that the American 
public square treats religious arguments differently that it treats secular arguments. In 
doing so, I will explain why both cases caused outrage among certain religious groups of 
people and offer my opinion in terms of how to address the controversial topic. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
1 Stephen Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1993), 8.  
2 Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. “Bill of Rights.” Cornell University, 
<http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/billofrights> (accessed Apr. 19, 2010. 
3 Carter, 8.  
4 Ibid. 
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Clarification of Terms 
Most important to the scope of this paper is an understanding of the term “secular.” 
In many cases, this word is considered to be antonymous with religious, i.e. to be secular 
is to be non-religious. However, more recent scholarship has attempted to define 
secularism with greater historical accuracy. Relevant to the scope of this paper is political 
secularism, a concept that “justifies the separation of religion from politics either by 
excluding from politics all ultimate ideals or by an appeal to the principle of political 
neutrality.”5 All religions are excluded equally, and believers are required to give up 
“what is of exclusive importance,” (i.e. their ultimate beliefs) for the common, collective 
good.6 Secularism of this type is colloquially referred to as the separation of church and 
state, which by definition is not an absence or removal of religion, but rather a division.  
The second term that requires a definition is “public square,” a concept that both 
Charles Taylor and Stephen Carter write about. Carter defines it as, “The arena in which 
our public moral and political battles are fought.”7 Taylor, who replaces the word square 
with sphere, provides a more informative definition: “A common space in which the 
member of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media…to discuss matters of 
common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind.”8 Common to both 
definitions is the idea that the public square represents a theoretical and practical space 
for the public to discuss matters of collective importance and interest. The public square 
is not the appropriate space for matters of personal interest. The question of religion’s 
relationship with the public square is one of considerable interest among scholars 
especially because religion can have both a public and private role in one’s life. 
Clergyman and author Richard John Neuhaus addresses this question in The Naked 
Public Square, his critique of religion and democracy in America. He argues that the 
public square must “exclude religion and religiously grounded values from the conduct of 
public businesses” based on his conclusion that America is strictly a secular society.9 
However this conclusion is questionable. In fact, according to the 2007 Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, only 4% of the over 35,000 Americans polled identified as 
either “agnostic” or “atheist.” Over 80% of participants identified belonging to a specific 
religious tradition.10 The apparent thriving of religion in America makes it difficult to ban 
it from the public sphere. Discussion becomes particularly problematic when topics such 
as abortion, which is tied to religion and politics, are debated. 
    
Abortion as a Lens 
As mentioned above, abortion is one of the hot-button issues in the debate that 
surrounds religion and politics in contemporary American society. According to 
Neuhaus, abortion law is “the single most fevered and volatile question that inescapably !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     5 Rajeev Bhargava, “Giving Secularism Its Due,” Economic and Political Weekly 29 (1994): 1786-1787.  
6 Ibid, 1787. 
7 Carter, 51. 
      8 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 85-88. 
9 John Richard Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids: 
Wiliam B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984), vii.  
10 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Report 1: Religious Affiliation,” U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey, http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (accessed Jan. 9, 2011). 
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joins religion and politics.”11 This provides a perfect lens through which to analyze the 
larger question of why the public square treats questions of religion differently than 
questions of secular subjects. Necessary to such an inquiry is an understanding of how 
the abortion question is connected to religion. At the most basic level of definition an 
abortion is the “the expulsion of the fetus before it is viable or able to survive outside the 
womb.”12 As science has granted researchers the information and technology necessary to 
develop tools to sustain life after progressively shorter gestation periods, the time after 
which the infant can survive has changed. Today a “good” prognosis in terms of survival 
and normal neurological developments exists for about 80% of infants born as early as 23 
weeks and weighing as little as 400 grams.13 Neonatologists can predict with almost no 
error when the infant can survive independently from the mother. In addition, science can 
tell us the number of weeks at which the fetus has developed pain receptors and at what 
age the fetus will have a detectable heartbeat. However, according to many religious 
Americans the scientific explanation is false because it contradicts what is implied in the 
Bible: life begins at conception.  
Of its many roles, religion is expected by many to provide answers to “big” 
questions: questions about life, death and purpose that we humans cannot answer for 
ourselves. Life and death go hand-in-hand with abortion and pro-life activists use religion 
and religious doctrine to support their views. For example, Focus on the Family, a global 
Christian ministry that adamantly rejects the practice of abortion states that, “The Bible is 
far from silent on the topic of the sanctity of human life, especially preborn life in the 
womb.”14 Writers on the Focus website post quotes from the Bible to prove their view 
that life begins at conception and abortion is murder.  
Aside from its contemporary link to religion, abortion has a long historical 
relationship with religion as well. In Roe vs. Wade, the text of the case indicates that 
people have been looking to religion for answers to the abortion question for at least as 
long as they have been questioning to more modern, secular authorities such as science. 
Much of the majority opinion, delivered by Justice Blackmun, is recapitulation of the 
historical attitudes and law regarding abortion practices. According to the text, Christian 
figures such as St. Augustine contributed to canon law that dictated abortion law: “The 
theological debate was reflected in the writings of St. Augustine, who made a distinction 
between embryo inanimatus, not yet endowed with a soul, and embryo animatus…Later, 
Augustine on abortion was incorporated by Gratian into the Decretum…recognized as the 
definitive body of canon law.”15 This is significant because it indicates the long 
relationship between abortion and religion.  
Besides its historical relationship with religion, abortion is also connected to religion 
because of its undeniably emotional character. Whether or not someone chooses to obtain 
one, even discussing an abortion can be emotionally taxing. However, the realm of 
science, and the non-religious framework in which it exists, often lacks an emotional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Neuhaus, 27. 
12 Dan Drucker, Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1973 through 1989: A Comprehensive Review 
with Historical Commentary (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 1990), 
13 Dr. Barry Dashefsky, personal communication, August 26, 2010. 
14 Carrie Gordon Earll, “What the Bible Says About the Beginning of Life,” Focus on the Family, 
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/lifechallenges/love_and_sex/abortion/what_the_bible_says_about_the_b
eginning_of_life.aspx 
      15 Roe et al vs. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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component because much of the subject matter does not directly affect those dealing with 
it. Furthermore, science is driven by fact, empirical observation, and tangible evidence. 
Though these elements are necessary in promoting progress, they are not enough to 
sustain or satisfy human beings. We need something more; and many people believe that 
this “more” is religion. In a recent New York Times op-ed, law professor Stanley Fish 
argues that religion provides the missing piece that modern secular society lacks.16  For 
many people, religion represents a crucial feature of decision-making and understanding 
within a secular society. Religion fulfills the role of a comfort by providing meaning, 
purpose, and reason behind what may otherwise be lacking in those areas.  
 
Background: Roe vs. Wade 
The very same First Amendment clauses that are meant to protect our freedom to 
exercise religion in this country have led the U.S. Supreme Court to seek to avoid 
religious judgments in the arena of life and death issues such as abortion. In the landmark 
1973 U.S. Supreme Court case Roe vs. Wade, Norma McCorvey, a pregnant single 
woman using the pseudonym Jane Roe, challenged the constitutionality of the Texas 
criminal abortion laws, which “proscribed procuring or attempting an abortion except on 
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life.”17 The majority decision, 
delivered by Justice Harry Blackmun on January 22, 1973, concluded that the laws were 
unconstitutional, citing the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “A state 
criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type…without regard to pregnancy state 
and without recognition of other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”18 The Court emphasized the right of privacy and 
extended its definition to “include the most intimate of all family planning decisions: the 
choice not to become a parent by ending a pregnancy.”19 The verdict was significant 
because it invalidated all state law that restricted a woman’s access to abortion. However, 
the Court’s decision did not grant access free of all restrictions. In conjunction with its 
ruling the Court established a trimester system based on “established medical fact,” that 
divided the three stages of fetal development.20 According to this system, during the first 
trimester the decision to abort was left up to the woman and her attending physician, 
during the second trimester the State can regulate abortion “in ways that are reasonably 
related to maternal health,” and during the third trimester the State can regulate “and even 
proscribe” abortion except in cases that threaten maternal life and health.21 
 
Avoiding the Question: Roe vs. Wade 
Of importance to this paper is the reasoning that the majority used to justify its 
opinion. Justice Blackmun and the Court examined how three issues– personhood, 
citizenship and privacy – relate to abortion and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment provides a definition of citizenship, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Stanley Fish, “Does Reason Know What It Is Missing?,” New York Times, April 12, 2010, Opinion 
Section. 
17 Roe et al vs. Wade. 
      18 Ibid. 
19 Melody Rose, Unavailable? Abortion Politics in the United States (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 
65. 
      20 Roe et al vs. Wade. 
      21 Ibid. 
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which Blackmun states includes only born persons. Based on this conclusion the legal 
protections afforded by the Constitution depend on the question of citizenship and not 
personhood because personhood is a precondition of citizenship. In his discussion of 
privacy Blackmun asserts that privacy, which is guaranteed to citizens, “includes the 
abortion decision” and uses this to justify the Court’s final ruling.22 As this brief 
overview shows Blackmun attempts to reach and justify his conclusion without alluding 
to religious or moral reasoning.  
The Court’s majority opinion features several noteworthy quotes that support 
Stephen Carter’s argument that the American public square treats religious arguments 
differently than it treats secular arguments. In his opening address Justice Blackmun 
states:  
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human 
existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitude toward life and family and their values 
and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence 
and to color one’s thinking about abortion.23  
Directly after making this statement he says that the Court resolved the issues 
presented based on “constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.”24 
These statements serve two functions: (1) they openly acknowledge the fact that religion 
influences how people view abortion; (2) they assure the public that the Court’s 
conclusion is free of all personal beliefs/values, including religion. In the course of the 
majority opinion Justice Blackmun made two additional references to the question of 
human life: “the definition of human life is for the legislature and not the courts.”25 In 
addition he states,  
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in 
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at 
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not 
in a position to speculate as to the answer.26 
These two quotes explicitly state the Court’s intention to purposely avoid the 
question of the origins of human life. Based on the second statement it seems as though 
the Court’s reasoning is as follows: Because experts, such as physicians and 
philosophers, cannot answer the question of life the justices should not be expected to be 
able to either. In short, the answer “stands outside the scope of judicial competence.”27 
However, there is a more important reason why the Court tried to avoid the question: to 
avoid violation of the First Amendment. A decision based on religious convictions could 
be interpreted as either preferring one religion to another, or preferring the institution of 
religion to non-religion. By justifying its verdict with reference to a secular standard of 
measurement – the right to privacy – the Court believed that it was making a neutral 
decision. However, the mere fact that the Court mentions the subject of life and 
personhood opens up the possibility for an argument that avoiding the religious aspect of 
the abortion question is impossible.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     22 Ibid. 
     23 Ibid. 
      24 Ibid. 
      25 Ibid. 
      26 Ibid. 
27 Stephen H. Galebach, “A Human Life Statute,” in Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspective, eds. Jay L. 
Garfield and Patricia Hennessey (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 125. 
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The Impossibility of Avoiding the Question: Roe vs. Wade 
Though the majority opinion states that the Court will not entertain the question of 
when life begins, it is not entirely successful in this endeavor. The Court succeeds in so 
far that it does not provide a concrete answer to this question, but fails in another respect. 
By choosing to purposely bypass the question of life the Court makes a moral judgment 
and violates the First Amendment. The reasoning for this is as follows: As mentioned 
previously, not only are the Free Exercise and Free Establishment clauses supposed to 
ensure that the federal government does not prefer one religion to others, but they are also 
supposed to ensure that it does not prefer religion as an institution to non-religion. By 
stating that it will not entertain the religious aspect of the abortion question, and that it 
will only examine the issue in terms of a secular framework, the Court favors non-
religion to religion. In pointedly deferring to a non-religious standard of valuation, it does 
not respect the views held by both sides of the abortion debate and essentially says to a 
large group of Americans that their fundamental beliefs and values are meaningless to the 
U.S. Supreme Court and under the Constitution.  
Although the Court claims that it will not entertain the question of human life, it 
does. By stating that the word person, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not 
“include the unborn,” the Court makes a claim about what it means to be a person under 
the law.28 This distinction is an integral part of the Court’s reasoning process, without 
which it would not have been able to arrive at its final conclusion. Stephen Carter sums 
up this argument with the following statement: “The Court...can reach the result that it 
does only by declining to define the fetus as human.”29 In other words, by not including 
the unborn in the category of persons protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court rules that the unborn do not constitute life entitled to Constitutional protection. 
Philosophy professor Roger Wertheimer supports this conclusion in “Understanding 
Blackmun’s Argument:”  
…So the Court must have held that a fetus is not a person. Indeed, strictly speaking 
the Court appears committed to holding that personhood is not acquired before live birth, 
because the Court ruled that even after viability, an abortion necessary to preserve the life 
or health of the mother may not be prohibited.30 
In this statement Wertheimer observes that because the Court ruled that even after 
viability an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the mother is allowed then 
personhood must not be defined until live birth. Otherwise the Court would be granting 
unfair advantage to one group of people (the mothers) over another (the fetuses). 
A statement that supports the conclusion that the Court was unsuccessful in its 
attempt to avoid the question of human life appears towards the end of the opinion. 
Justice Blackmun states: “In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as 
persons in the whole sense.”31 The quote summarizes the Court’s findings in terms of the 
legal status of the fetus, namely that when examined through the lens of the Constitution !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     28 Roe et al vs. Wade. 
29 Carter, 254. 
30 Roger Wertheimer, “Understanding Blackmun’s Argument: The Reasoning of Roe v. Wade,” in 
Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives, eds. Jay L. Garfield and Particia Hennessey (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 107. 
     31 Roe et al vs. Wade.  
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it is not recognized as a person, and therefore is not afforded the rights guaranteed to 
persons. The implications of this conclusion are important. In determining that the fetus 
is not protected by the Constitution the Court takes away the mechanism for protecting its 
rights. In effect the law draws a divide between fetuses and born-persons, judging the 
former as unqualified for protection under the law. Undeniably this represents a moral 
judgment made in respect to the status of the fetus.  
 
Background: Planned Parenthood vs. Casey 
Less than twenty years after it delivered what is consistently referred to as the 
“landmark decision” regarding abortion, the U.S. Supreme Court once again revisited the 
issue and was given the opportunity, and in fact asked, to overturn the decision made in 
Roe vs. Wade.32 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania vs. Robert P. 
Casey the constitutionality of five provisions featured in the Pennsylvania Abortion 
Control Act of 1982 were simultaneously challenged: (1) the “informed consent rule” 
which required a woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent prior to the 
procedure and specifies that she must be provided with certain material at least 24 hours 
before the abortion; (2) the “parental consent rule” which required minors to obtain 
parental consent before receiving an abortion; (3) the “spousal notification rule” which 
required women to give prior notice to her husband; (4) the “24 rule which requires” that 
a woman wait one day after giving consent to obtain the abortion; (5) reporting 
requirement rules imposed on facilities that perform abortions.33 The narrow 5-4 plurality 
opinion delivered by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter on June 22, 1992 
concluded that, “the essential holding of Roe vs. Wade should be retained and once again 
reaffirmed. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional 
analysis which we cannot now repudiate.”34 Of the specific provisions brought into 
question, the Court approved of the first, second and fourth provisions and struck down 
the third.  
Unlike the Roe opinion, which founded a woman’s right to choose an abortion on the 
right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Planned Parenthood vs. 
Casey opinion grounded this right in the Fourteenth Amendment’s notion of “liberty.” 
The plurality opinion stated that, “The Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision 
to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It declares that no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law.’ The controlling word in the case before us is ‘liberty.’”35 In 
order to fully understand the Court’s reasoning one must understand what was meant by 
liberty, a rather nondescript term. The plurality decision stated that liberty includes and is 
defined by “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”36 This reasoning eventually led the Court to 
conclude: “The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     32 Wertheimer, 105. 
33 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Robert P. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
34 Ibid. 
     35 Ibid. 
     36 Ibid. 
7
Dashefsky: Abortion & the Public Square: An Examination of How American Secu
Published by Digital Commons @ Colgate, 2012
! 117!
central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot 
renounce.”37 
Another significant aspect of the Casey decision concerns its treatment of the 
trimester system established in Roe. Casey rejected the trimester system, basing its 
decision on recent medical advancements. The plurality opinion argued that the trimester 
approach was no longer necessary in ensuring that the woman’s right to choose an 
abortion did not become subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting fetal life. 
However, despite recognizing this flawed aspect of Roe, the Casey Court failed to 
recognize in terms of another aspect of Roe that needed to be addressed. The Casey case 
provided the Supreme Court with a second chance to address the question of human life 
in terms of how it relates to abortion, but once again, the Court tried to avoid this central 
question.  
 
Avoiding the Question: Planned Parenthood vs. Casey 
The opinion text indicates that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter tried to avoid 
making a moral judgment and entertaining the question of human life by making a 
decision that was based on what they called “reasoned judgment.” The plurality opinion 
states:  
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call 
upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by 
tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not 
susceptible of expression as a simple rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate 
state policy choices with which we disagree.38 
This statement is important because it reiterates the fact that the Court will interpret 
the Constitution through the lens of logical and objective reason, as opposed to opinion 
and personal preference. By stating that it will base its conclusion on reason the Court 
dismisses the prospect of basing its decision on moral judgments, which are bound in 
emotion and certainly not reason. The plurality justices follow the precedent Blackmun 
set in Roe vs. Wade by outwardly acknowledging that they won’t examine abortion with 
their personal values in mind: “Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our 
most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is 
to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”39 Integral to this 
statement is the plurality’s deduction that the concept of liberty is not controlled by one’s 
personal preferences. Instead, liberty can be applied to situations dispassionately in order 
to reach rational conclusions. Justice Scalia, who concurs in part and dissents in part, 
relevantly disagrees with the plurality claim to neutrality: “There is of course no way to 
determine that as a legal matter; it is in fact a value judgment.”40 This statement is 
reminiscent of that used in the Roe vs. Wade because it also leads to the conclusion that 
the answer to the question of human life is not something that the courts should seek to 
answer.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     37 Ibid.  
     38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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The Impossibility of Avoiding the Question: Planned Parenthood vs. Casey 
As discussed previously, the Roe justices failed in two respects: first, because they 
did not avoid the question of human life as they said that they would, and second, 
because in entertaining this question they made a value judgment that led to the 
determination that fetuses are unqualified for protection under the law. This judgment 
undermines the validity of the case because it constitutes a blatant inconsistency in terms 
of what the Justices claimed to do and what was actually done. Though argued almost 
twenty years later, undoubtedly after countless scholars noted Roe’s inconsistency, Casey 
also failed in the same respects. However, unlike the Roe case, in which none of the 
involved participants noted this inconsistency, in the Casey case Justice Scalia, in his 
dissenting opinion, highlighted the flaw.  
Scalia argues that although the authors of the plurality opinion claim to have 
exercised reasoned judgment to determine that liberty, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, includes the right to “define the mystery of human life,” and consequently 
“the right to destroy human fetuses,” in reality they made a decision based on personal 
views.41 In his characteristic style Scalia undermines the plurality opinion in the 
following way: first, he states that the Court fails to provide adequate reasons to “explain 
how it is that the word ‘liberty’ includes the right to destroy human fetuses.”42 Second, he 
argues that instead of providing clarification, the Court just describes the relationship 
between abortion and liberty in terms of several phrases including, “central to personal 
dignity and autonomy,” and involving “personal autonomy and bodily integrity.”43 Scalia 
goes on to point out that these same phrases are applicable to other acts that the Court has 
previously determined are not entitled to protection under the Constitution such as 
polygamy, adult incest and suicide. Scalia concludes that if the Court can apply the same 
set of adjectives, which serve to operationally define liberty, to practices that are both 
lawful and unlawful the Court must not have established a strict and fixed way to apply 
the concept. As a result the Court has unavoidably engaged in exercising a value 
judgment and not a reasoned judgment. 
The Casey Court indirectly made another value judgment by accepting Blackmun’s 
conclusion in Roe that the word person, as used by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not 
“include the unborn.”44 Only by accepting this conclusion as true could the Casey 
plurality feasibly make the argument that it did. In order to explain this point I will 
examine what could have transpired had the opposite occurred: If the Casey Court 
disagreed with Roe and concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s use of the word 
person did include the unborn, then fetuses and born persons would be equally protected 
under the law. Given equal protection under the law the Casey argument in support of 
abortion would have no basis. Whether or not liberty encompassed a woman’s decision to 
obtain and abortion would be meaningless because, under the Constitution, the fetus and 
the woman would receive equal protection. Granting the woman the right to abort the 
fetus would unfairly advantage the woman. Therefore, though an independent moral 
judgment was not made by concluding that Constitutional liberty only applies to the 
woman, the Casey Court is necessarily accepting and bolstering Roe’s judgment that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
      41 Ibid. 
      42 Ibid. 
      43 Ibid. 
      44 Roe et al vs. Wade.  
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fetus is not considered a person under the law. Once again the impossibility of avoiding 
the question of human life and making a value judgment is confirmed. 
 
Concluding Thoughts  
The above analyses of both Roe vs. Wade and Planned Parenthood vs. Casey support 
Stephen Carter’s argument that the public square treats religious arguments differently 
than it treats secular arguments. In the case of abortion, representatives of the public 
square, such as the United States Supreme Court, tried to avoid questions pertaining to 
religion by characterizing them as beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. However, 
secular topics were approached much differently and used without reservation as 
evidence to support the Courts’ conclusions. Many Americans, especially those who 
subscribe to pro-life ideology, were, and continue to be, outraged by Roe vs. Wade, as 
they should be. The Roe and Casey decisions do threaten religious values and unfairly 
advantage the non-religious. They succeed in doing so because they fail to address the 
religious aspects that are integral to the abortion question.  
Some argue that the outrage felt by pro-lifers is directed more towards the reasoning 
behind the decision than the actual decision itself. Guido Calabresi summarizes this view 
in the following quote from Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law: “The Court, when it 
said that fetuses are not persons for purposes of due process, said to a large and 
politically active group…It does not matter not matter whether a fetus is alive. A fetus is 
still not protected by our Constitution.”45 In effect this statement told the Christian Right 
and other deeply religious people that their beliefs were not acceptable tools for public 
argument. It excluded them from the public square. The continued relevance of the 
abortion question is evidenced by the strong opinions held and voiced by both sides of 
the debate. It is safe to say that in the future we would like to avoid another Roe vs. Wade 
situation. Instead both pro-choice and pro-life, and religious and non-religious Americans 
would prefer a solution that did not result in anger and outrage. 
Considering the abortion history of the last several decades this seems unlikely. 
However, a reexamination of the original principle that this essay sought to explore – the 
public square’s unequal treatment of religious questions – may lead to some informative 
conclusions in terms of how we might begin to address the abortion debate.  One of the 
reasons why the public square’s unequal treatment of religion is quickly becoming a topic 
of conversation among scholars is because there is a resurgence of religious belief in 
America. More and more Americans are using their religious beliefs as the basis for their 
fundamental values. In The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World 
Politics, Peter Berger writes: “…the assumption that we live in a secularized world is 
false. The world today…is as furiously religious as it ever was and in some places more 
so than ever.”46 As a result, banishing religion to private sphere is no longer considered to 
be acceptable by these people. Therefore, I think the first step in terms of finding a 
solution to the abortion debate concerns respecting and listening to all views concerning 
the topic. Instead of prematurely rejecting certain opinions or lines of reason based on the 
values in which they are grounded we should allow everyone’s opinion equal time in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes and the Law (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985): 95. 
[Emphasis original]. 
46 Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999): 2. 
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public square. Calabresi points out the value in such an approach by stating that it 
communicates to both side, but especially the losing one, the message that “Your views 
matters, and are worthy.”47 Though this is by no means a solution, perhaps 
communication will foster the beginning of a more accepting and tolerant relationship 
between the pro-life and pro-choice camps.  
In terms of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the subject of abortion, I don’t agree 
with its decision to immediately dismiss the question of human life because of its 
religious nature. As both the Roe and Casey cases have shown, these decisions led to 
major criticism of the Courts’ reasoning. Abortion is a topic that straddles both the 
secular and religious worlds, and trying to confine it to one obviously just does not work. 
Though it would be unrealistic to expect the Court itself to decide the question of human 
life – a task that would likely take countless hours and still not be solved– I don’t think it 
would be unrealistic or excessive to allow experts from different fields to explain their 
perspectives to the Court. For example, a secular physician and a member of the Christian 
Right could both address the Court and explain their views on the origins of life in terms 
of science and the Bible, respectively. Based on each of the two testimonials the Justices 
would decide to either adopt one of the theories of life or reject both, and proceed with 
their decision-making process. Though one could argue that by adopting a theory of life 
the Court would be violating the First Amendment, a counterargument could be made 
claiming that Court is giving the same treatment to both by allowing each equal time and 
consideration in the Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
      47 Calabresi, 98. 
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